It is unusual to discuss the United Nations as the central component in a federalising international order but it must be remembered that 'federalism' is not a precise concept. Livingston wrote in 1952 of a 'spectrum of federal societies'; stating further: This is no less true of federalism than it is of any other form of political organisation. Federalism is a function not of constitutions but of societies. Viewed in this way, it will be seen that federalism is not an absolute but a relative term; there is no specific point at which a society ceases to be unified and becomes diversified. 2 Eschewing any standard definition of 'federalism' at the outset, this chapter explores the use of the term, and other forms of organisation, in the context of the League of Nations and the United Nations, focusing in particular on the UK's role in shaping those organisations and being a key member of them. The question then raised is whether harnessing the coercive powers of enforcement given to the Security Council is evidence of a federalising international order, moreover one with the potential to bypass the rule of law in the UK? As with federalism, the concept of the 'rule of law' is contested but for the purposes of this chapter is deployed in the broad sense identified by Waldron: that 'respect for the law can take the edge off human political power, making it less objectionable, less dangerous, more benign and more respectful'.
mainly because they go further than authorisations to use force in that they impact internally within the domestic legal order.
The danger highlighted in this chapter is that, rather than the earth being covered by universal laws agreed to by all nations as envisaged by Tennyson, 188 nations are being ruled by five, at least on security matters and, moreover, ruled by an organ whose responsibility is for enforcing and keeping the peace rather upholding international law.
The chapter examines the UK's engagement and interaction with the UN's political and legal order in order to discern evidence of the development of a rudimentary international federal structure. In particular, the move since 1999 towards targeted sanctions as well as more general Security Council legislation against terrorism has enabled the UK to implement laws without any real accountability. Judicial accountability has increased, however, but is either readily by-passed or is not strong enough. In contrast with its approach to the EU, where it was a reluctant international federalist until the recent referendum in June 2016 and will now withdraw from that federalising order in the next two to three years, the UK's position as a permanent member of the Security Council means that it is a willing participant in such developments, although it would not recognise the use of federal terminology in this context. While the UK is anti-federalist in the context of the EU, it is generally prointernationalist, but not explicitly pro-federalist, in the context of the UN. Without hesitation we believe that, if we really want to make war in Europe a phenomenon which cannot be repeated, there is only one way to do so and we must be outspoken enough to consider it: a federation of European states under a central power which governs them. Any other milder version is but a delusion. 5
While the experiment in European union did not start until after the Second World War, but we must realize that what we have done is to exchange a scheme which might or might not have worked for one which cannot work, and that instead of limiting the sovereignty of states we have actually extended the sovereignty of the Great Powers, the only states whose sovereignty is still a formidable reality in the modern world. It is far more widely recognized than it was in 1919 that no international instrument, no constitutional specific, will suffice to maintain peace … The Charter by itself is nothing, if it fails to rally the loyalty of the major Powers who alone can give it body and life. The British delegation [at San Francisco] took a foremost part in seeking to make the Security Council something more than a policeman who is called in when there is already a danger of a breach of the peace. We sought, and sought successfully, to make it a place where the policies of States, and especially the greater States, could be discussed and reconsidered for the time, especially when they showed signs of divergencies as to threaten the harmony of international relations. Collective security is not merely a promise to act when an emergency occurs, but it is active co-operation to prevent emergencies occurring … 40
There is some evidence that British leaders saw the UN, in particular the Security Council, as a form of supranational power or, perhaps more reluctantly, a federation of great powers, in which the UK, along with the other permanent members, exercised powers rather than being subject to them.
The powers granted to the 'federal government' element of the UN are vast. The right or power of a federal government to use force within constituent states in order to maintain security and stability is a deeply problematic one even within established federal states (eg Russian use of force in Chechnya), but even more so when the right is exercised at the international level. Nonetheless, the Security Council was granted the power to forcefully intervene in Member States under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, the UK's position as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council signifies that it cannot be the direct object of UN intervention against its will, thereby limiting the effects on the UK of the supranational powers of the UN provided for in the Charter.
During the Cold War, the effects of obligations created by the Security Council on the UK were limited to duties to carry out measures in the rare instances when they were adopted against other states. The UK used its permanent seat to protect it from intervention in a variety of ways, not always involving the use of the veto. Ireland on the grounds that it was purely a domestic matter and so there was no threat to international peace. 43 Any proposal would have been vetoed by the UK in any event but the UK was able to use its position to prevent the matter progressing that far.
Similarly in the situation in Southern Rhodesia in 1965, the UK initially used its position to prevent discussion of the matter on the basis that this was a domestic matter, 44 until it had clearly lost control over its colony following the unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority regime in 1965. Thereafter, the UK was active in seeking, and gaining, support for the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia, 45 and also the enforcement of the oil embargo element by means of an authorisation to intercept oil supplies reaching Rhodesia through the port of Beira in Mozambique.
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The potential loss of the permanent seat by the UK in a future reformed Security
Council would mean that UN-authorised intervention against it would become possible. standard of evidence required in civil cases. 60 Only one MP questioned the legal basis upon which the executive and not the courts could impose assets freezing orders.
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There is little political will in Parliament to challenge executive decisions made on security matters. Indeed, the fact that such obligations result from decisions of the Security Council is almost seen as putting them beyond domestic political scrutiny.
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Judicial scrutiny has also been hampered by a reluctance to challenge the executive on security matters and, although cases like Ahmed suggest greater judicial activism, reluctance remains in cases where the executive is implementing its security obligations arising from the UN Charter.
VI. Targeted Sanctions Regimes
The The Resolution invoked the language of the primacy clause of the Charter (Article 103) by calling upon all states to to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of coming into force of the measures imposed.
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However, the absolute primacy suggested by this provision has to be balanced by statements in other Security Council resolutions, which declared that states 'must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, and should adopt measures in accordance with international law, in particular human rights, refugee and humanitarian law'. aspect of terrorism, while in contrast, the definition of terrorism in the UK contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act of 2000 is not so proscribed.
In the case of targeted sanctions imposed against suspected terrorists or terrorist supporters, the temporary freezing of an individual's assets, and restriction of his or her movements, can be construed as administrative measures necessary to prevent threats from terrorism manifesting in indiscriminate acts of violence. As such they are not arguably subject to full due process protections. However, a number of listings appear to be almost permanent without real review, and like indefinite preventive detention, cease to be responses to imminent existential threats but are rather forms of punishment without due process of law. There is a danger that by creating a legal framework allowing for quasi-permanent listings, the UN is endorsing a system of punishment for wrongs determined by executive organs of states and organisations without any determination or trial before a court. As is the case with targeted killings, the roles of judge, jury and executioner are rolled together. This is even more so as regards the auto- But these resolutions are the product of a body of which the executive is a member as the United Kingdom's representative. Conferring an unlimited discretion on the executive as to how those resolutions, which it had a hand in making, are to be implemented seems to me to be wholly unacceptable. It conflicts with the basic rules that lie at the heart of our democracy. 105 This was understood to mean 'not that these were draconian because they were orders, but that they were draconian because of their content. So we need to be careful before reintroducing measures that are very similar to those orders'. 106 The point that measures could be the same whether made directly by executive order pursuant to the 1946 Act or by executive order pursuant to a 2010 Act of Parliament seemed to be lost on the House. The reality was better reflected by a statement by one MP that during his 23 years in the House he found that 'whenever the word "terrorism" appears in any order or other legislation, there tends to be cross-party support'.
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X. Conclusion
Law-making that is a combination of international and national executive decisionmaking offends the rule of law in the sense used in this chapter because the executive has been allowed by Parliament and the Courts to by-pass human rights guarantees. The international and national executives have harnessed the supranational potential of the UN so that UK law is subject to the decision-making of the Security Council which, though located within a treaty and therefore a legal instrument, is almost wholly uncontrolled by that instrument or by the judicial mechanisms created by it, as evidenced by the International Court's judgments in the Lockerbie cases. Plato warned that 'where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state … is not far off'.
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Thus far the UK Supreme Court has failed to adopt a strong presumption that human rights obligations should not be overridden by obligations arising under Security
Council resolutions, in contrast to European judgments discussed above.
109 Those judgments leave a number of questions unanswered, including the relationship between international, regional and national legal orders, but they do invite the UK to look more closely at ways of upholding its human rights obligations while respecting security duties arising out of Security Council decisions.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the UN was not simply an improvement on the cooperative model of international organisation embodied in the League of Nations. The UN Charter contained elements of centralisation and supranationality that had the potential, when the geopolitical context allowed, to unleash a federalising international order. In discussing processes of federalisation 107 ibid cols 688-89 (Vaz). 108 Plato, The Laws (trans TJ Saunders, London, Penguin, 1970) 174.
109 Kadi above n 80, Al-Jedda above n 84, Nada above n 85, Al-Dulimi above n 87.
Livingston warns that centralised instruments created to solve problems become part of the governmental architecture and, furthermore, can easily become outdated and difficult to remove. The idea of a federation of 'Great Powers' in the core membership of the Security Council, including the UK and France, is no longer valid, and the idea of a world government in matters of peace and security in the hands of five states, formed out of the alliance forged in the Second World War, bears little resemblance to the multipolar and changing world in which we live. Livingston states further:
As the nature of society changes, demands for new kinds of instrumentalities are created and these demands are met by changing or abolishing old instrumentalities and substituting new ones in their place. But it can scarcely be hoped that the new instrumentalities will keep pace with the changing pattern of social relationships, and as a result the pattern of instrumentalities tends to lag behind the changes in society itself … This is complicated further by the fact that the instrumentalities, once put into operation, become rigidified and acquire status of their own. Tushnet, in considering national federal systems, makes the following point:
Federal systems in the modern world drift towards centralization because of globalization and the dominance of a legal realist legal culture. The rate of drift, however, is affected by elements in the design of federal institutions. A constitutional specification of powers to be exercised solely by national units, a priori judicial review, a dual judiciary, and judges trained in formalist traditions all retard the drift towards centralization. 112
At the international level there is a drift towards centralisation in the Security Council for certain security matters, which can only be countered by states asserting their sovereignty, not to exclude human rights criticism as has occurred in the past, but to 110 Livingston above n 2 at 93-94. protect the human rights they have agreed to uphold. National judiciaries, as well as regional courts, will have to compensate for the International Court of Justice's inherent weaknesses as a court of review, and reliance by courts on agreed human rights norms as opposed to accepting realist arguments based on security, will further limit the drift towards a federalising international order.
In order to nudge security obligations towards rule of law compliance at both international and national levels, UK courts will need to develop a more critical and coherent approach to the obligations arising under the Charter in order to reconcile those obligations with ones arising from human rights and other treaties. Article 103
was not intended, and in any case should not be seen, as a constitutional supremacy clause to be relied upon to make it easier for the Security Council and governments (ie 
